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You can download and view instagram stories, posts, reels, followers and following of all public Instagram profiles. Do I need to provide my own Instagram profile to view someone's posts or stories IG? No, you don't. All you need is nickname of profile you want to view. What devices do your Insta Stalker support? Is it possible to download someone else's instagram stories anonymously? Yes, it is. SASSA will end with a finalized busi-ness strategy to guide future activities.
An eventual SASSA acquisition program and beyond will encompass full-scale production of a standardized protection capability. The goal is integrated on-board awareness and protection capabilities for all US space systems. As the foundation for space control, SSA encompasses intelligence on adversary space operations; surveillance of all space objects and activities; detailed reconnais-sance of specific space assets; monitoring space environmental conditions; monitoring cooperative space assets; and conducting integrated command, control, communications, processing, analysis, dissemination, and archiving activities.
Program Element F, Space Situational Awareness Operations, fields, upgrades, operates and maintains Air Force sensors and information integration capabilities within the SSA network while companion program element F, Space Situation Awareness Systems, develops new network sensors and improved information integration capabilities across the network. Activities funded in the SSA Operations program element focus on surveillance of objects in earth orbit to aid tasks including satellite tracking; space object identification; tracking and cataloging; satellite attack warning; notification of satellite flyovers to U.
Forces; space treaty monitoring; and technical intelligence gathering. The bombers can carry various modifications of the Kh, AS and Kh cruise mis-siles and gravity bombs. Russia operates two satellites of the new-generation early-warning system, EKS, and a network of early-warning radars. The satellite, Cosmos, is currently undergoing tests.
Second spacecraft, Cosmos, was launched in May The early-warning satellites were transmitting information in real time to the Western command centers at Serpukhov, near Kurilovo, Kaluga oblast and Eastern center near Komsomolsk-on-Amur. The information is processed there and transmitted to the command center in Solnechnogorsk.
The main command center of the system and the battle-management radar are located in Sofri-no Moscow oblast. The command center of the system and its radar are undergoing a soft- ware upgrade. The system includes the Don-2N battle-management phased-array radar, command center, and 68 short-range interceptors of the 53T6 Gazelle type. The 32 long-range 51T6 Gorgon interceptors have been removed from the system. The short-range interceptors are deployed at five sites -- Lytkarino 16 interceptors, Sofrino 12, Korolev 12 Skhodnya 16, and Vnukovo Long-range missiles used to be deployed with two units with headquart-ers in Naro-Fominsk and Sergiyev Posad The system was accepted for service in Space surveillanceSpace surveillance system is operated by the Main space-surveillance command center.
To monitor objects on low earth orbits and determines parameters of their orbits, the system uses the the early-warning radar network. The space surveillance network also includes the Krona system at Zelenchukskaya in the North Caucasus, which includes dedicated X-band space surveillance radars.
Another system of this type is being deployed near Nakhodka on the Far East. To monitor objects on high-altitude orbits, the space-surveillance system uses optical obser-vations. The main optical observation station, Okno, is located in Nurek, Tajikistan. Its tele-scopes allow detection of object at altitudes of up to 40, km. The station began operat-ions in Space-surveillance tasks are also assigned to observatories of the Russian Aca-demy of Sciences.
In addition, three radars--Baranovichi, Murmansk, and Pechora--have been "upgraded. Barnaul and Yeniseisk are Voronezh-DM. The radar in Baranovichi which is in Belarus is an old one-of-a-kind Volga radar. The Daryal radar in Pechora is even older - it's one of the two original Daryal radars built in the s. Construction of new radar, probably of the Voronezh-VP kind, began there earlier this year. As we can see, the upgrade of the early-warning radar network has been a very successful program.
The space segment of the early-warning system, in contrast, appears to be behind the schedule. It appears to be undergoing tests. The new armament program calls for deployment of ten satellites of the EKS system by , but this plan does not seem particularly realistic. It should be noted, however, that for Russia the space-based segment of the early-warning system is not as as critical as for the United States, since it could never really rely on the "dual phenomenology" approach adopted by the United States.
This is illustrated on this figure: It shows that in some scenarios SLBMs launched from the Atlantic, satellites don't add much to the warning time. In any event, since Russia doesn't have forward-deployed radars, the radar warning comes to late to provide a useful check of the satellite informa-tion. To deal with the situation, the Soviet Union developed a different mechanism that allowed it to wait for signs of the actual attack such as nuclear explosions before launching its missiles.
The arrangement is often referred to as the Dead Hand, since it does involve a certain predelegation of authority as well as the mechanism that ensures that decapitation does not prevent retaliation. The system, however, is not automatic that idea was nixed in the s and requires humans to be involved in the decision to launch. Located in the Push- kino district of Moscow it is a quadrangular truncated pyramid 33 metres ft tall with sides metres ft long at the bottom, and 90 metres ft long at the top.
Each of its four faces has an 18 metres 59 ft diameter Ultra high frequency band radar giving degree coverage. The system is run by an Elbrus-2 supercomputer. It has a range of km for targets the size of a typical ICBM warhead. The first radar, in Lekhtusi near St Petersburg, became operational in There is a plan to replace older radars with the Voronezh by The Voronezh radars are described as highly prefabricated meaning that they have a set up time of months rather than years and need fewer personnel than previous generations.
They are also modular so that a radar can be brought into partial operation whilst being incomplete. At the launch of the Kaliningrad radar in November Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was quoted as saying "I expect that this step [the launch of the radar] will be seen by our partners as the first signal of our country's readiness to make an adequate response to the threats which the missile shield poses for our strategic nuclear forces.
Nuclear weapons. Assured nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon systems safety, security, and control remain of paramount importance. Nuclear command and control safety and security also remain of paramount importance as stated in DoDD S Government communi-cations and information systems, which involves information security and cryptanalysis and cryptography.
NSA is a key com-ponent of the U. Intelligence Community, which is headed by the Director of National Intelligence. The Central Security Service is a co-located agency created to co-ordinate intelligence activities and co-operation between NSA and other U. Military cryptanalysis agencies. Information systems. Assets, personnel and allies in Europe. It is flexible, initially using mobile radars and interceptors mounted on Aegis-equipped Ticonderoga class cruisers and Arleigh Burke class destroyers.
This new direction for European missile defense broke with the plans pursued by the Bush administration. The Bush plans had called for deployment of a ground-based missile defen-se system in Europe, similar to the system deployed in California and Alaska.
This included bilateral agreements to station ground-based interceptors in Poland and a radar installation in the Czech Republic. This represented "the first sustained deployment of a ballistic missile defense-capable ship" in support of the European PAA. The SM-3 IA succesfully intercepted a medium-range ballist missile target in its most recent test on February 13, Block IA has a single color seeker, a 21 inch-diameter booster, and is Block IA costs between 9 and 10 million per unit.
Sensors and Combat SystemInitially, the system will use sea-based sensors mounted on the Aegis ships, as well as a forward-based mobile X-band radar on land. The U. So far, seven have been produced, and two are currently deployed in Israel and Japan. The sensors and interceptors will be brought together under the Aegis combat system. This is a system capable of tracking simultaneous targets.
Phase 1 will primarily use Aegis version 3. Interceptors will also be mounted on an increasing number of Aegis BMD ships. In FY, the U. Navy plans to have 32 Aegis BMD ships. This interceptor differs from the Block IA in its "seeker" technology, consisting of a two color seeker, or "kill warhead," and improved optics. The Block IB is estimated to cost between 12 and 15 million per unit. Sensors and Combat Systems In Phase 2, sensors will be integrated with updated versions of the Aegis combat system.
This will supplement the deployments already underway at sea and in Romania and will extend coverage over a greater percentage of Europe. This new variant will be faster than Block I 4. These faster interceptors could potentially increase coverage to the whole European continent. The program is scheduled to begin flight testing in Improved seeker and optics will be included.
Aegis BMD ships are scheduled to be equipped with version 5. Was planned to have an improved seeker and a higher performance booster, with a velocity of According to the Defense Science Board , the SM-3 IIB's planned mission to intercept targets prior to the deployment of multiple warheads or penetration aids — known as "early intercept" — requires "Herculean effort and is not realistically achievable, even under the most optimistic set of deployment, sensor capability, and missile technology assumptions.
Category and DescriptionPresident George W. Bush announced Dec. As of February , the U. The United States also possesses 18 warships equipped with Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, a system intended to counter short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles as of January Developing and deploying ballistic missile defenses ranked high among the priorities of the George W. Bush administration.. The administration also aggressively sought foreign partners for the U.
Still, the technology remains unproven. Intercept tests have involved substitute components in highly scripted scenarios. In thirteen tests, the Pentagon has hit a mock warhead eight times. In the most recent test, conducted on December 5, , the interceptor successfully destroyed the mock warhead; however, the incoming missile failed to deploy countermeasures meant to fool the interceptor into missing its target. Pentagon officials acknowledge that the initial system will be rudimentary.
But they argue that some defense is better than none at all. In addition, they assert that the only way to conduct more strenuous and realistic testing of the system is to deploy it.. For more than five decades, the United States has intermittently researched and worked on missile defenses. The planned deployment this fall will mark the second time that the United States has moved to deploy a defense against long-range ballistic missiles. The first effort, Safeguard, was shut down within a few months of being declared operational in October because Congress concluded the defense was too expensive and ineffectual.
Missile base located in North Dakota. The Bush administration inherited seven main missile defense programs, including the ground-based missile interceptor system and two related satellite programs. For the most part, the Bush administration continued work on these same programs, although it recast some, cut others, and added new projects.
It canceled one sea-based system—the Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense System—and significantly down-sized a space-based laser initiative, while commencing new efforts to develop interceptors to attack multiple targets and to strike enemy missiles early in their flights.
During the Clinton administration, Republicans repeatedly asserted that the development of working missile defenses was being hindered by a lack of political will, not scientific or engineering challenges. However, several missile defense programs have fallen further behind schedule and suffered setbacks due to technical difficulties under the Bush administration.
An aircraft designed to be armed with a powerful laser—known as the Airborne Laser—is now more than two years behind schedule and may be shelved. One of the two inherited satellite programs has been overhauled and renamed, while the other has far exceeded cost and schedule estimates. In general, the Bush administration reorganized missile defense programs, placing all of them under one big tent the Missile Defense Agency rather than working on each one in isolation. Nevertheless, the Pentagon maintains individual program offices for each system, albeit with an eye toward sharing technology among the systems and exploring how they might operate together.
In addition, the Pentagon is actively pushing to expand some of the earlier theater missile defense programs to try and tackle the strategic mission. ICBMs travel farther, faster, and are more likely to employ countermeasures intended to fool defenses than shorter-range missiles. The ABM Treaty permitted the development of theater missile defense systems but prohibited work on nationwide strategic defenses. At this time, only the ground-based interceptor system has been tested against strategic ballistic missile targets, although the Pentagon has started to investigate whether some radars and sensors used in theater systems might also be capable of tracking a strategic ballistic missile.
Preliminary findings are encouraging, according to the Pentagon, which has declined to provide specific test results. The Obama administration has expressed general support for the idea of national missile defense, but indicated that some Bush-era programs may be up for review. Also included are Pentagon estimates on when each defense may have an initial, rudimentary capability as well as when it could be fully operational. Ballistic Missile BasicsBallistic missiles are powered by rockets initially but then they follow an unpowered, free-falling trajectory toward the target.
There are four general classifications of ballistic missiles:Short-range ballistic missiles, traveling less than 1, kilometers approximately milesMedium-range ballistic missiles, traveling between 1,—3, kilometers approximately , milesIntermediate-range ballistic missiles, traveling between 3,—5, kilometers approximately 1,, milesIntercontinental ballistic missiles ICBMs, traveling more than 5, kilometersShort- and medium-range ballistic missiles are referred to as theater ballistic missiles, whereas ICBMs or long-range ballistic missiles are described as strategic ballistic missiles.
The ABM Treaty prohibited the development of nationwide strategic defenses, but permitted development of theater missile defenses. Ballistic missiles have three stages of flight:The boost phase begins at launch and lasts until the rocket engines stop firing and pushing the missile away from Earth. Depending on the missile, this stage lasts between three and five minutes. During much of this time, the missile is traveling relatively slowly, although toward the end of this stage an ICBM can reach speeds of more than 24, kilometers per hour.
The missile stays in one piece during this stage. The midcourse phase begins after the rockets finish firing and the missile is on a ballistic course toward its target. During the early part of the midcourse stage, the missile is still ascending toward its apogee, while during the latter part it is descending toward Earth. This stage takes less than a minute for a strategic warhead, which can be traveling at speeds greater than 3, kilometers per hour.
Short- and medium-range ballistic missiles may not leave the atmosphere, have separating warheads, or be accompanied by decoys or other countermeasures. The EKV destroys its target by colliding with it. This process is referred to as hit-to-kill. StatusTo date, the system has had eight successful intercept attempts in twelve developmental tests. The most recent test, on Dec. Another 10 interceptors are to be deployed at FortGreely before the end of There are no plans to fire interceptors from FortGreely for testing purposes.
The interceptors under the Clinton plan were to have been supported by a land-based X-band radar, but the Bush administration also developed a sea-based X-band radar SBX. SBX was used on Dec. This radar, known as the Cobra Dane radar, is only be able to track missiles fired from the direction of Asia because the radar is fixed to face northwest. MDA is also exploring the construction of a third missile defense site in Europe. The Bush administration signed a deal with Poland on August 20, , to place ten missile interceptors on Polish territory.
The Bush administration also won the approval of the Czech government on April 3, , to build a tracking radar facility in the CzechRepublic. The United States is upgrading two foreign-based, early-warning radars to help track ballistic missiles launched from the direction of the Middle East. Fylingdales has been upgraded and is operational, while the Thule-based radar will be integrated into the missile defense system by the end of fiscal year The SM-3 is a hit-to-kill missile comprised of a three-stage booster with a kill vehicle.
The SM-3 is considered too slow to intercept a strategic ballistic missile. Designed to CounterInitially, the Aegis BMD is geared toward defending against short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles during their midcourse phase with an emphasis on the ascent stage.
StatusThe system has a record of fourteen intercepts in eighteen flight tests. The two most recent tests, both in November , were failures. In a November 1 test, two target missiles and two interceptors were launched from Aegis-equipped destroyers in the Pacific Ocean. One interceptor hit its target, but the other did not. In another test, on November 19, , the interceptor lost track of its target seconds before impact.
Navy has eighteen ships outfitted with the Aegis BMD system. Sixteen of these ships are deployed in the Pacific Ocean, leaving two in the Atlantic. Between and , the Navy hopes to build an Aegis force of 84 ships: 22 cruisers and 62 destroyers.
The laser beam is produced by a chemical reaction. Designed to CounterAlthough the Pentagon originally aimed to field the ABL against theater ballistic missiles, the Pentagon now contends the ABL may have an inherent capability against strategic ballistic missiles as well. The expanded ABL objective is to shoot down all ranges of ballistic missiles in their boost phase. The plane was not equipped with the laser. By , an ABL test plane had successfully tracked a target and hit it with a low-power laser.
The target was not a ballistic missile, however, but was mounted on another aircraft. Although Clinton administration plans first projected an ABL intercept attempt to take place in , development delays have led the Pentagon to push back such a test several times. It is now expected to take place in THAAD missiles are fired from a truck-mounted launcher.
Intercepts could take place inside or outside the atmosphere. StatusThe system had two successful intercept attempts in the summer of after experiencing six test failures between April and March THAAD has tested successfully five times since being redesigned. In two other tests the interceptor was not launched due to malfunctions of the target missiles. The missile is guided by an independent radar that sends its tracking data to the missile through a mobile engagement control station.
StatusDuring earlier developmental testing, the system struck nine out of 10 targets. In four, more difficult operational tests between February and May that involved multiple interceptors and targets, seven PAC-3s were to be fired at five targets. Of the seven PAC-3s, two destroyed their targets, one hit but did not destroy its target, one missed its target, and three others did not launch. PAC-3s destroyed two Iraqi short-range ballistic missiles during the conflict and shot down a U.
Fighter jet. Earlier Patriot models also deployed to the region shot down nine Iraqi missiles and a British combat aircraft. Missile defense systems by providing tracking data on missiles during their entire flight. Two satellites would provide little, if any, operational capability. The Pentagon estimates that at least 18 satellites would need to be deployed to provide coverage of key regions of concern.
Worldwide coverage could require up to 30 satellites. The program has cost at least 6 billion more than expected, and is several years behind schedule. Strategic Command in December The second sensor—HEO-2—is expected to come online in the first quarter of The booster is expected to travel at least six kilometers per second, which is comparable to an ICBM.
The kill vehicle will not carry an explosive warhead but is designed to destroy its target through the force of a collision. The Pentagon is developing mobile land- and sea-based versions of KEI, as well as fixed land-based units. Designed to CounterKEI is intended to destroy strategic ballistic missiles during their first minutes of flight when their rocket engines are still burning.
StatusOn Dec. The Pentagon awarded the KEI contract several months after the independent American Physical Society released a study asserting that boost-phase intercepts would be technically possible under very limited circumstances. The test was also the first to use remote tracking data; the radar used to track the target was forward-based hundreds of miles away instead of on the ship. Additional tests of the Block IB missile are ongoing.
These tests will be conducted by the armed forces rather than by the Missile Defense Agency. The first operational test took take place in October ; the second will occur in FY Test 1 Oct. Arms control policy. Efforts on the part of this Administration to reaffirm the significance of the Treaty are described below.
In the Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that each may have two precisely limited ABM deployment areas later limited by mutual agreement to one: to protect its capital or to protect an ICBM launch area. To promote the objectives and implementation of the Treaty, the Parties established the Standing Consultative Commission SCC, which meets at least twice a year.
Also the terms of the Treaty specify that a review of the Treaty shall be conducted every five years. In , the Parties to the Treaty agreed by means of a Protocol to reduce the number of permitted ABM deployment areas to one for each side. The Administration therefore reaffirmed that the ABM Treaty prohibits the develop-ment, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based, and mobile land-based ABM systems and components without regard to the technology utilized.
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the question of treaty succession arose. At the same time, the growing threat posed by theater ballistic missiles, and the need to combine effective protection against such threats while avoiding development of an ABM capability, has prompted the U. The ABM Treaty itself does not provide clear guidance on this question.
This clarification is being negotiated in the Treaty's imple-menting forum, the Standing Consultative Commission. The United States was reassured during this review that other states shared the view of the Treaty's principal obligations and of the need to strengthen the Treaty.
In the Joint Communique that was adopted at the Treaty Review, the partici-pating states concluded that: Commitment to the ABM Treaty was reaffirmed and it was agreed that maintaining the viability of the Treaty in view of political and technological changes remains important. The delegations at the Review advocated continued efforts to strengthen the ABM Treaty The Standing Consultative Commission SCCIn the past, many issues related to theater and strategic defenses have been vigo-rously debated within a number of different fora, including the Standing Consultative Commission.
At recent sessions of the SCC, which were held in Geneva from November 29 - December 17, , January 24 - February 4, , and March 21 - April 21, , the United States presented proposals designed to preserve the viability of the Treaty in light of the political and technological circumstances of the present day The other participating delegations have also introduced their own positions and ideas.
Despite some differences of view, the negotiations have demonstrated that there exists a significant degree of commonality in the approach to theater missile defense among SCC participants. There is general agreement 1 that the threat of ballistic missile proliferation is real; 2 that there is a shared interest in being able to defend against this threat; and 3 that the ABM Treaty must be clarified to allow for the field-ing of adequate theater missile defenses. Commitment to the ABM Treaty.
The Clinton Administration has reaffirmed the "narrow" or "traditional" interpretation of the ABM Treaty as the correct interpretation, i. The Administration has withdrawn the broad revisions to the Treaty previously pro-posed in the SCC which were intended to permit expanded deployment of strategic ABM defenses. When the Treaty was nego-tiated, both parties understood that this demarcation was left undefined. The time has come to define it.
This will be accomplished by agreement in the SCC, not unilaterally. How the final agreement is formalized, as a legal matter, must properly await the out-come of the negotiations. Finally, the President has directed the Administration to con-sult closely with Congress on these issues.
On July 13,, Thomas Graham, Jr. December U. And the result is pretty darn gloomy reading. For my own part I will also ad Norway. NATO today is not able to defend it's most vulnerable states! Please read the report yourself and make up your own opinion. We must fight ISIS and terrorism in all it's uglyness. Keep your eyes and ears wide open and repport anything suspicious. As currently postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members.
Across multiple plays of the game, Russian forces eliminated or bypassed all resistance and were at the gates of or actually entering Riga, Tallinn, or both, between 36 and 60 hours. After eastern Ukraine, the next most likely targets for an attempted Russian coercion are the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Like Ukraine, all three spent many years as component republics of the Soviet Union, gaining independence only on its dissolution.
The three are also contiguous to Russian territory. This storyline is disturbingly familiar. Unlike Ukraine, the Baltic states are members of NATO, which means that Russian aggression against them would trigger Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty —the collective defense provision according to which an at- tack against any signatory is considered to be an attack against all. This creates an obligation on the part of the United States and its alliance partners to be prepared to come to the assistance of the Baltic states, should Russia seek to actively and violently destabilize or out-and-out attack them.
And we will defend the territorial integrity of every single Ally. Because the defense of Tallinn and Riga and Vilnius is just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London. Article 5 is crystal clear: An attack on one is an attack on all.
We will be here for Latvia. We will be here for Lithuania. You lost your inde- pendence once before. With NATO, you will never lose it again. More than 20 allied divisions were stationed to defend that frontier, with many more plan- ned to flow in as reinforcements before and during any conflict see Figure 1. They are, however, defended only by the indigenous forces of the three Baltic states, which muster the rough equivalent of a light infantry brigade each.
The distances in the theater also favor Russia. From the border to Tallinn along the main highways is about km; depend- ing on the route, the highway versus crow-flight distance to Riga is between about and km. From the Polish border to Riga, on the other hand, is about km as the crow flies; to Tallinn, almost km. The terrain in the theater is a mix, with large open areas interspersed with forested regions; lakes; and, in some places, sizeable wetlands. Off-road mobility in parts of all three Baltic countries could be difficult, especially for wheeled vehicles.
There is, however, a fairly rob- ust network of roads and highways throughout, and there are few large rivers to serve as natural defensive lines and barriers to move- ment. Our analysis sought to account for the effects on movement and combat of this variability in terrain. Today, it can muster for operations in its Western Military District MD—the region adjacent to the Baltic states—about 22 battalions, roughly the same number of divi- sions forward deployed in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries in These forces appear more than ade- quate, however, to overwhelm whatever defense the Baltic armies might be able to present.
The games employed Russian forces from the Western MD and the Kaliningrad oblast—a chunk of sovereign Russian territory that sits on the northeastern border of Pol- and, along the Baltic Sea coast—totaling approx- imately 27 maneuver battalions in a short-warning attack to occupy either Estonia and Latvia or both and present NATO with a rapid fait accompli. The scenario assumed about a week of warning, which en- abled NATO to flow some reinforcements into the Baltics— mainly light infantry units that could be speed- ily air transported, along with airpower.
Tables 1—4 list the forces with which both sides were credited at D-Day—when the hostilities began. The two sides adopted strategies that were generally similar across the games played. The Red players typically made a main effort toward the Latvian capital of Riga, with a secondary attack that quickly secured the predominantly ethnic Russian areas of northeast Estonia, and then proceeded toward Tallinn. The outcome was, bluntly, a disaster for NATO. Four factors appeared to contribute most substantially to this result.
Indeed, the only armor in the NATO force is the light armor in a single Stryker battalion, which is credited with having deployed from Germany during the crisis buildup prior to the conflict. NATO has no main battle tanks in the field. Even their eight airborne battalions are equipped with light armored vehicles, unlike their U. Second, Russia also enjoys an overwhelming advantage in tactical and operational fires. The Russian order of battle includes ten artillery battalions. Each Russian brigade or regiment in the Western MD or Kaliningrad was assumed to be able to produce one deployable battalion tactical group for the attack.
This is consistent with the pattern observed in Russian Army operations in Ukraine. The majority of Russian ground forces in Kaliningrad were assumed to be held in reserve for defense of the enclave, and were not available for offensive operations; they are not listed in this table. Deployed from Aviano Air Base, Italy. We allowed some NATO combat aircraft to be based in Sweden, based on discussions with RAND colleagues who have had informal discussions with Swedish defense officials about scenarios similar to this one.
Analytically, this allowed us to explore the possible value of such arrangements. The relative abundance of bases available in Central and Western Europe, especially relative to the size of the deployed force, makes our results relatively insensitive to this assumption, although Swedish basing proved valuable insofar as it allowed NATO combat aircraft access to the battlespace that largely avoided the concentration of modern air defenses located in Kaliningrad.
The leaders and people of the Baltic states, who would need to decide whether to defend their capitals, would confront the first quandary. Quality light forces, like the U. Airborne infantry that the NATO players typically deployed into Riga and Tallinn, can put up stout resistance when dug into urban terrain. But the cost of mounting such a defense to the city and its residents is typically very high, as the residents of Grozny learned at the hands of the Russian Army in — Furthermore, these forces likely could not be resupplied or relieved before being over- whelmed.
The second and larger conundrum would be one for the U. President and the leaders of the other 27 NATO countries. Under the best of circumstances, this would require a fairly prolonged buildup that could stress the cohesion of the alliance and allow Russia opportunities to seek a political reso- lution that left it in possession of its conquests. Even a successful counteroffensive would almost certainly be bloody and costly and would have political consequences that are unforeseeable in advance but could prove dramatic.
Any counteroffensive would also be fraught with severe escalatory risks. If the Crimea experience can be taken as a precedent, Moscow could move rapidly to formally annex the occupied territories to Russia. Finally, it is also unclear how Russia would react to a successful NATO counteroffensive that threatened to decimate the bulk of its armed forces along its western frontier; at what point would tactical defeat in the theater begin to appear like a strategic threat to Russia herself?
The deterrent impact of such a threat draws power from the implicit risk of igniting an escalatory spiral that swiftly reaches the level of nuclear exchanges between the Russian and U. Unfortunately, once deterrence has failed—which would clearly be the case once Russia had crossed the Rubicon of attacking NATO member states—that same risk would tend to greatly undermine its credibility, since it may seem highly unlikely to Moscow that the United States would be willing to exchange New York for Riga.
Coupled with the general direction of U. The third possibility would be to concede, at least for the near to medium term, Russian control of the territory they had occupied. The worst be would be the collapse of NATO itself and the crumbling of the cornerstone of Western security for almost 70 years. But the cost of mounting such a defense to the city and its residents is typically very high. Avoiding the fait accompli is valuable because it begins to present Russia with the risk of a conventional defeat and thereby is at least the beginning of a more credible deterrent.
On the one hand, Russia today looks to its northwest and sees little between its forces and the Baltic Sea but highway and the prospect of forcing NATO into the three-sided corner described above. Our goal was to devise a posture that would present an alternative landscape: one of a serious war with NATO, with all the dangers and uncertainties such an undertaking would entail, including the likelihood of ultimate defeat at the hands of an alliance that is mater- ially far wealthier and more powerful than Russia.
Not all these forces would need to be forward stationed. Given even a week of warning, NATO should be able to deploy several brigades of light infantry to the Baltics. Soldiers from the U. Army combat aviation assets rotationally based in Germany could self-deploy to provide some mobile antiarmor firepower, but by and large, these fast-arriving forces would be best suited to digging in to defend urban areas.
In our games, the NATO players almost universally chose to employ them in that way in and immediately around Tallinn and Riga. What cannot get there in time are the kinds of armored forces required to engage their Russian counterparts on equal terms, delay their advance, expose them to more frequent and more-effective attacks from air and land-based fires, and subject them to spoiling counterattacks. Coming from the United States, such units would take, at best, several weeks to arrive, and the U.
Army currently has no heavy armor stationed in Europe. At the height of the Cold War, West Germany fielded three active corps of armored and mechanized units; today, its fleet of main battle tanks has shrunk from more than 2, to around The United Kingdom is planning on removing all its permanently stationed forces from Germany by ; currently, only one British brigade headquarters, that of the 20th Armoured Infantry, remains in continental Europe, and the British government is committed to its withdrawal as a cost-saving measure.
Combined arms battalion, the personnel for which would fly in and mate up with the prepositioned equipment of the European Activity Set stored in Grafenwoehr, Germany. Getting this unit into the fight is a complicated process that will not be instantaneous. Breaking out the equipment—24 M-1 main battle tanks, 30 M-2 infantry fighting vehicles, assorted support vehicles—preparing it for movement, transporting it by rail across Poland, offloading it, and roadmarching it forward into the battle area are unlikely to take less than a week to 10 days.
It is critical to emphasize that this relatively modest force is not sufficient to mount a forward defense of the Baltic states or to sustain a defense indefinitely. But it should eliminate the possibility of a quick Russian coup de main against the Baltic states, enhancing deter- rence of overt, opportunistic aggression. There are several options for posturing the necessary heavy forces, each carrying different combinations of economic costs and political and military risks.
For example, NATO could permanently station fully manned and equipped brigades forward in the Baltic states; could preposition the equipment in the Baltics, Poland, or Germany and plan to fly in the soldiers in the early stages of a crisis; could rely on rotational presence; or could employ some combination of these approaches.
The next phase of our analysis will explore a range of these options to begin assessing their relative strengths and weaknesses. It is also important to point out that, critical though they are, maneuver brigades are insufficient in and of themselves. Armor and infantry battalions must be adequately supported with artillery, air defense, logistics, and engineering. Over the past 15 years, the Army has reduced the amount of artillery organic to its divisions and has essentially stripped out all air defense artillery from its maneuver forces.
Further, there are presently no fires brigades in Europe able to augment the modest number of guns at the brigade and battalion level. This is in marked contrast to Russian tables of organization and equipment, which continue to feature substantial organic fires and air defense artillery, as well as numerous independent tube and rocket artillery and surface-to-air missile units. This disparity has had substantial impacts in our wargames.
Armor brigade combat team ABCT to fight what was in essence a covering force action to delay the advance of a major Russian thrust through Latvia. A critical element of such a tactic is the use of fires to cover the maneuver elements as they seek to disengage and move back to their next defensive position. In this case, however, the ABCT was so thoroughly outgunned by the attacking Red force, which was supported by multiple battalions of tube and rocket artillery in addition to that of the battalion tactical groups themselves, that the battalion on one flank of the brigade was overwhelmed and destroyed as it sought to break contact, and the rest were forced to re- treat to avoid the same fate.
The lack of air defenses in U. Maneuver forces showed up in another game, in which two arriving NATO heavy brigades were organized into a counter- attack aimed at the flank of a Russian thrust toward Riga. The absence of short-range air defenses in the U. Units, and the minimal defenses in the other NATO units, meant that many of these attacks encountered resistance only from NATO combat air patrols, which were overwhelmed by sheer numbers.
The result was heavy losses to several Blue battalions and the disruption of the counter- attack. This highlights a critical finding from our analysis: A successful defense of the Baltics will call for a degree of air-ground synergy whose intimacy and sophistication recalls the U. Against an adversary, such as Russia, that poses multidimensional threats, airpower must be employed from the outset of hostilities to enable land operations, and land power must be leveraged to enable airpower.
Preventing a quick Russian victory in the Baltics would also require a NATO command structure able to plan and execute a complex, fast-moving, highly fluid air-land campaign. What cannot get there in time are the kinds of armored forces required to engage their Russian counterparts on equal terms, delay their advance, expose them to morefrequent and more-effective attacks from air- and land-based fires, and subject them to spoiling counterattacks.
NATO corps that defended the inner German border during the Cold War each possessedadmittedly to different degrees in some cases, the ability to plan for and fight the forces they would command in wartime. Tactical and operational schemes of maneuver were developed and rehearsed; logistics support was planned; the reception, staging, and onward integration of reinforcing forces were laid out and, if never practiced in full, tested to an extent that lent confidence that procedures would work reasonably well when called upon.
Traditionally, the level of planning called for in the initial phase of the defense has been the province of a U. At the height of the Cold War, two Army corps under the operational command of 7th Army had planning responsibilities for Europe; today, none do. The Army should consider standing up a corps headquarters in Europe to take responsibility for the operational and support planning needed to prepare for and execute this complex combined arms campaign, as well as a division headquarters to orchestrate the initial tac- tical fight, to be joined by others as forces flow into Europe.
Today, the West confronts a Russia that has violently disrupted the post—Cold War European security order. Since the early s, the United States and its NATO partners have shaped their forces based on the belief that Europe had become an exporter of security, and for more than two decades that assumption held true.
Unfortunately, the usually unspoken accompanying assumption—that the West would see any disruption to that status quo coming far enough in advance to reposture itself to meet any challenge that might emerge—appears to have missed the mark. The first step to restoring a more-robust deterrent is probably to stop chipping away at the one that exists.
If NATO wishes to position itself to honor its collective security commitment to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, its members should first hit the pause button on further steps that reduce its ability to do so. While some ongoing actions may be too far advanced to stop, the United Kingdom and the United States should evaluate whether additional withdrawals of forces from Germany are wise, given the changed circumstances.
These measures need not be limited to strictly military ones. For example, one challenge NATO would face in the event of a Baltic crisis would be moving heavy equipment and supplies from storehouses and ports in Western Europe east to Pol- and and beyond. A successful defense of the Baltics will call for a degree of air-ground synergy whose intimacy and sophistication recalls the U. Substantial investments may be necessary to facilitate these flows, investments that becau- se they also benefit the civilian economy— may prove more politically palatable than direct expenditures on troops and weapons.
But troops and weapons are also needed, and it verg- es on disingenuous for a group of nations as wealthy as NATO to plead poverty as an excuse for not making the marginal investments necessary to field a force adequate at the very least to prevent the disaster of a Russian coup de main. Army would not be inexpen- sive—the up-front costs for all the equipment for the brigades and associated artillery, air defense, and other enabling units runs on the order of 13 billion.
However, much of that gear—especially the expensive Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles—already exists. Some is available due to recent cuts in Army force structure; there is also equipment in long-term storage, and some could be transferred from Reserve Component units, if needed. So, although there may be some costs to procure, upgrade, or make serviceable existing equipment—as well as to transition units from one type to another—it is likely much less than 13 billion.
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